We study achievable rates of reliable communication in a power-constrained two-way additive interference channel over the real alphabet where communication is disrupted by a power-constrained jammer. This models the wireless communication scenario where two users Alice and Bob, operating in the full duplex mode, wish to exchange messages with each other in the presence of a jammer, James. Alice and Bob simultaneously transmit their encodings x A and x B over n channel uses. It is assumed that James can choose his jamming signal s as a noncausal randomized function of x A and x B , and the codebooks used by Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob observe x A`xB`s , and must recover each others' messages reliably. In this article, we provide upper and lower bounds on the capacity of this channel which match each other and equal 1 2 log`1 2`S NR˘in the high-SNR regime (where SNR, signal to noise ratios, is defined as the ratio of the power constraints of the users to the power constraint of the jammer). We give a code construction based on lattice codes, and derive achievable rates for large SNR. We also present upper bounds based on two specific attack strategies for James. Along the way, sumset property of lattices for the achievability and general properties of capacity-achieving codes for memoryless channels for the converse are proved, which might be of independent interest. 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘i s the capacity in high-SNR regime, we do not believe that this is tight in all regimes. Our intuition comes from the following improved converse result. We are able to push the boundary of zero-rate regime inward via certain symmetrization strategy which we call z-aware symmetrization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our work is motivated by jamming in multiuser wireless channels. Consider two users Alice and Bob who wish to exchange independent messages (assumed to be uniformly distributed in a set of size 2 nR ) with each other over the wireless medium. The communications is disrupted by an adversarial jammer, James, who injects additive noise into the channel. We assume that all three parties operate in the full-duplex mode, which means that they are able to transmit and receive simultaneously. Alice and Bob encode their messages into n-length sequences x A and x B with real valued components and are simultaneously transmitted across the channel. At the same time, James transmits a jamming sequence s. The channel is additive, and each user gets to observe y " x A`xB`s . The goal of the two users is to recover each others' message reliably from this observation.
The signals transmitted by Alice, Bob and James are required to satisfy quadratic power constraints of nP, nP , and nN respectively, i.e., }x A } 2 ď nP, }x B } 2 ď nP, }s} 2 ď nN.
We assume that James can select his jamming signal s as a noncausal function of zx A`xB , and also the codebooks/coding strategies used by Alice and Bob. However, James has no additional information about the messages or the transmitted signals in addition to that revealed by x A`xB and the users' codebooks. We call this the pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel problem. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The goal is to design sequences of encoders and decoders for Alice and Bob such that the probability of error of decoding the respective messages is vanishing in n. Here, the randomness is over the encoding processes used by Alice and Bob, as well as the jamming signal. We say that a rate R is achievable if there exist sequences of codes for which the associated probabilities of decoding error is vanishing in n, and the capacity is the supremum of all achievable rates.
In this paper, we give an upper bound on the capacity. We show that reliable communication is impossible for N ě 3P {4. For N ă 3P {4, we show that the capacity is upper bounded by 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘. We also describe a coding scheme which shows that for sufficiently large values of P {N , this bound is achievable.
The problem considered in this paper falls under the general setup of arbitrarily varying channels (AVCs), introduced by Blackwell et al. [BBT60] . This framework is a good model for channels where the noise statistics are arbitrary and unknown, and also where communication is disrupted by active adversaries. Much of the literature has focused on point-to-point communication where Alice wants to send a message to Bob, and James attempts to jam the transmission. The quadratically constrained point-to-point AVC (also called the Gaussian AVC) was studied by Blachman [Bla62] , who gave upper and lower bounds on the capacity of the channel under the assumption that James observes a noiseless version of the transmitted codeword (a.k.a. the omniscient adversary). Later, Hughes and Narayan [HN87] , and Csiszár and Narayan [CN91] , studied the problem with an "oblivious" James, who knows the codebook, but does not see the transmitted codeword. They showed that under an average probability of error metric, the capacity of the oblivious adversarial channel is equal to 1 2 log`1`P N˘w hen P ą N and zero otherwise. arXiv:2001.02575v2 [cs.IT] 9 Jan 2020 Successive works have characterized the error exponent of the oblivious Gaussian AVC [TH91] , capacity of the oblivious vector Gaussian AVC [HN88] , and the Gaussian AVC with an unlimited amount of shared secret key between Alice and Bob [SG06] . Sarwate [Sar12] , and later Zhang et al. [ZVJS18b] studied the myopic AVC, where James can choose his jamming vector as a function of the codebooks and a noisy copy of the transmitted signal. A related model was studied by Haddadpour et al. [HSBJ13] , who assumed that James knows the message, but not the exact codeword transmitted by Alice. Game-theoretic versions of the problems have also been considered in the literature, including the point-to-point case [Méd97] , with multiple antennas at the transmitter and receiver [BC96] , and also the two-sender scenario [SU09] . The list decoding capacity under the oblivious and omniscient cases were studied by Hosseinigoki and Kosut [HK18] and Zhang and Vatedka [ZV19] respectively.
Multiuser AVCs have received attention only very recently. Multiple access channels with adversarial jamming were studied in [PS19c] , [SBDP19] . The capacity of the relay channel was analyzed in [PS19b] , while [PS19a] gave inner and outer bounds on the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with side information at the encoder.
The work most related to our paper is that on the discrete-alphabet two-way additive channel with an adversarial jammer which was studied by Jaggi and Langberg [JL17] . They showed that for discrete additive channels over F q where James' transmissions must satisfy a Hamming weight constraint of p, the capacity is equal to 1´H q ppq. In other words, James can do no worse than transmitting random noise. Many of our ideas were inspired by this work, and we will elaborate on this in the coming sections. However, the conclusions that we can draw about the quadratically constrained case are different. In particular, the capacity is lower that what we would get if the noise vector were Gaussian. A game-theoretic version of the quadratically constrained case we study here was studied by McDonald et al. [MAY19] .
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR RESULTS AND TECHNIQUES A. Overview of results
For a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, let SNR :" P {N be the signal-to-noise ratio.
Theorem 1 (Achievability). For a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, given any sufficiently small constant δ ą 0, if SNR ą gpδq for some function g such that gpδq δÑ0 Ý ÝÝ Ñ 8, then both users can achieve rate 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘´δ . That is, C A ě " 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘‰`a nd C B ě " 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘‰`. Theorem 2 (Converse). For a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, for any sufficiently small constant δ ą 0, neither of the users can achieve rate larger than 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘`δ . That is, C A ď " 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘‰`a nd C B ď " 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘‰`. Corollary 3 (Capacity). For a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, given any sufficiently small constant δ ą 0, if SNR ą gpδq for some function g such that gpδq δÑ0 Ý ÝÝ Ñ 8, then C A " C B " " 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘‰`. Both our achievability and converse results can be trivially generalized to the asymmetric case, where the transmissions of Alice and Bob must satisfy }x A } 2 ď nP A , }x B } 2 ď nP B , James can independently jam the received vectors of Alice and Bob with jamming signals s A and s B which must satisfy
Here Alice and Bob respectively receive y A " x A`xB`sA and y B " x A`xB`sB . For this pP A , P B , N A , N Buadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, let SNR A :" P B {N A and SNR B :" P A {N B be the SNRs of user one and two, respectively. Then we have Corollary 4 (Capacity, asymmetric case). For a pP A , P B , N A , N Buadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, given any sufficiently small constants δ 1 , δ 2 ą 0, if SNR A ą g 1 pδ 1 q and SNR B ą g 2 pδ 2 q for some functions g 1 and g 2 such that g 1 pδ 1 q δ1Ñ0 ÝÝÝÑ 8 and g 2 pδ 2 q δ2Ñ0 ÝÝÝÑ 8, then C A " Note that the capacity 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘v anishes when N ě 2P or SNR ď 1{2. Though the capacity theorem indicates that B. Overview of proof techniques and related work Our ideas are inspired by [JL17] , which characterized the capacity of the discrete additive two-way channel with a jammer. They showed that using randomly expurgated linear codebooks for Alice and Bob achieves the symmetric capacity 1´H q ppq, where H q ppq denotes the q-ary entropy of p. This implies that James can do no worse than transmitting random noise. It was also observed that neither linear codes nor uniformly random codebooks can achieve the capacity of this channel. Indeed, our codebook design closely mimics [JL17] : we use randomly expurgated lattice codebooks.
Unlike the discrete case studied in [JL17] , the setup we study in this paper poses additional challenges. In our setup, if the additive noise were random Gaussian with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) N p0, N q components, then the capacity is equal to 1 2 log 2`1`P N˘. However, we give a converse to show that the capacity is in fact strictly below this. An important observation is that the capacity of the discrete additive adversarial two-way channel is equal to the list decoding capacity (which also turns out to be the capacity with random noise). Unlike the discrete case, we show that the capacity of the pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel is (for large values of P {N ) strictly above the list decoding capacity.
1) Proof techniques for upper bound: We provide three separate converse bounds for this problem by providing three attack strategies for James: ‚ Clearly, if P ď N , then James can transmit a random codeword from Alice's (resp. Bob's) codebook chosen independently of everything else. Over the randomness in the choice of the codeword, Bob (resp. Alice) will then be unable to distinguish between the codewords transmitted by Alice (resp. Bob) and James. Hence, the capacity is zero. ‚ We can improve this to show that the capacity is zero for P ď 3N {4. James independently selects a random codeword x 1 A from Alice's codebook and transmits´1 2 pz´x 1 A q whenever he has enough power. With high probability (w.h.p.), this attack vector satisfies the power constraint, and Bob receives 0.5x B`0 .5px A`x 1 A q. Bob cannot decide whether x A or x 1 A was transmitted, and therefore the probability of error is bounded away from zero. ‚ In the regime when N ď 3P {4, we define a different attack for James. He can transmit s "´αz`g, where g " N p0, γ 2 I n q and α, γ are constants that can be optimized over. This instantiates an effective AWGN channel for Bob (resp. Alice) which implies that the capacity cannot exceed that of this effective AWGN channel. Upon optimizing the constants, we get that the capacity cannot be any larger than 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘. To prove this, we analyze general properties of the empirical properties of capacity-achieving codes for the AWGN channel (which we call AWGN-good codes) which we believe are novel results and might be of independent interest. We show that independent codewords chosen uniformly from any AWGN-good code are approximately orthogonal with high probability.
2) Proof techniques for lower bound: Let us briefly summarize the main elements of the achievability proof in [JL17] . A key step used is that even after expurgation, James is sufficiently confused about the transmitted codeword: if C A and C B are the codebooks obtained by independent random expurgations of the original linear code C, then |C A`CB | « |C A | and leaks very little information about the individual codewords to James. As a consequence, James cannot "push" the transmitted codeword to the nearest codeword in the corresponding codebook. The final step is to show that as long as the original code is list decodable with small list sizes, the expurgated code is uniquely decodable w.h.p. (over the randomness in the code expurgation).
Unlike the discrete case, we are not able to prove a matching lower bound on the capacity for all values of P, N . We show that for sufficiently large P {N , the capacity is C " 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘. The code for Alice and Bob is obtained by independently expurgating a lattice code with spherical shaping (to satisfy power constraint). What makes the quadratically constrained case more challenging than the discrete one is that due to the power constraint, the sum of two codewords leaks information about the individual codewords. However, if the original lattice code is suitably chosen, then we can show that James is sufficiently confused. Even then, following the approach in [JL17] gets us to only the list decoding capacity of 1 2 log P N . To improve the rate, we introduce a proof technique inspired by [ZVJS18a] . We show that for every attack vector that James can instantiate, the effective decoding region is significantly smaller than B n py, ? nN q 1 w.h.p. (over the randomness in the choice of message). To prove the lower bound, we show the following results which may be of independent interest: ‚ Given any "good" lattice Λ and the associated lattice codebook C -Λ X B n p0, ?
nP q, the sum of two independently and uniformly chosen codewords from C lies in a thin shell of radius ? 2nP . We call this the typical sumset of the lattice code. ‚ For any vector v P R n , a uniformly chosen codeword from C is almost orthogonal to v. Consequently, two random codewords are almost orthogonal to each other. ‚ The above points reinforce the idea that codewords from a good lattice code have many properties similar to those chosen from random Gaussian codebooks. ‚ For any vector in the typical sumset, most pairs of codewords that sum to this vector respectively lie in a thin strip (See Fig. 4 and Fig. 5a ). This implies that given James' observation, the actual x A (resp. x B ) is uniformly distributed in a thin strip.
‚ As a result of the above property, for every attack vector s that James can instantiate, the effective decoding radius turns out to be
which is even larger than ? nN . However, the (effective) decoding ball actually makes a relatively small intersection with the coding ball with high probability. We show that with high probability, the average/typical effective decoding radius is
, and actually also smaller than ? nN as one would naively assume. We can then use the list decoding argument followed by the analysis of unique decodability as in [JL17] .
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The notational conventions that we follow throughout the paper is fixed in Sec. IV. Basics on concentration inequalities, high-dimensional geometry, information/coding theory and background on lattices are provided in Sec. V and Appendix A. We formally define the problem treated in this paper in Sec. VI. In Sec. VII, to motivate our posterior estimation-style decoding rules, we provide intuition as to why in the high-SNR regime, the capacity turns out to be 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘, lower than the AWGNpP, N q channel capacity 1 2 log`1`P N˘, higher than the list-decoding capacity 1 2 log P N . Sec. VIII contains a full proof of the achievability results. Specifically, 1) Our code construction based on expurgated lattice code is described in Sec. VIII-A; 2) Various error events to be considered in subsequent sections are defined in Sec. VIII-B; 3) In Sec. VIII-C, we prove sumset property of lattices which is useful in the rest of the analysis and might be of independent interest elsewhere; 4) In Sec. VIII-D, we show that α, the component of s that is parallel to z can be well estimated by the receiver; 5) In Sec. VIII-E, we show that the effective decoding radius can also be well estimated by the receiver; 6) The rate is properly set in Sec. VIII-F; 7) The average effective decoding radius is computed in Sec. VIII-G; 8) Finally, the probability of decoding error is bounded in Sec. VIII-I using McDiarmid's inequality; 9) Additionally, as a bonus section, in Sec. VIII-J, we provide improved analysis of sumset property which yields bounds independent of r cov pΛq. Converse results are proved in Sec. IX. Specifically, 1) The scale-and-babble strategy that yields a tight outer bound in the high-SNR regime is described in Sec. IX-A;
2) The strategy is analyzed in Sec. IX using information inequalities;
3) The bounding procedure of certain term Q (the probability that the scale-and-babble jamming vector violates James' power constraint) is deferred to Sec. IX-C; 4) Being useful in the converse argument and of independent interest, the proof of an empirical independence property that is universal to any AWGN capacity-achieving code is further deferred to Sec. IX-D; 5) A symmetrization-type attack strategy which we call z-aware symmetrization is described and analyzed in Sec. IX-E. The paper is concluded in Sec. X with some final remarks and open questions of future interests.
IV. NOTATION
Conventions. Sets are denoted by capital letters in calligraphic typeface, e.g., C, I, etc. Random variables are denoted by lower case letters in boldface or capital letters in plain typeface, e.g., m, x, s, U, W , etc. Their realizations are denoted by corresponding lower case letters in plain typeface, e.g., m, x, s, u, w, etc. Vectors (random or fixed) of length n, where n is the blocklength without further specification, are denoted by lower case letters with underlines, e.g., x, s, x, s, etc. The i-th entry of a vector x P X n is denoted by xpiq since we can alternatively think x as a function from rns to X . Same for a random vector x. Matrices are denoted by capital letters in boldface, e.g., P, Σ, etc. Similarly, the pi, jq-th entry of a matrix G P F nˆm is denoted by Gpi, jq. We sometimes write G nˆm to explicitly specify its dimension. For square matrices, we write G n for short. Letter I is reserved for identity matrix. Functions. We use the standard Bachmann-Landau (Big-Oh) notation for asymptotics of real-valued functions in positive integers.
For two real-valued functions f pnq, gpnq in positive integers, we say that f pnq asymptotically equals gpnq, denoted f pnqgpnq, if lim nÑ8 f pnq gpnq " 1.
For instance, 2 n`log n -2 n`log n`2n , 2 n`log n ffi 2 n . We write f pnq .
" gpnq (read f pnq dot equals gpnq) if the coefficients of the dominant terms in the exponents of f pnq and gpnq match,
For instance, 2 3n . " 2 3n`n 1{4 , 2 2 n . " 2 2 n`log n . Note that f pnq -gpnq implies f pnq . " gpnq, but the converse is not true. For any q P R ą0 , we write log q p¨q for the logarithm to the base q. In particular, let logp¨q and lnp¨q denote logarithms to the base two and e, respectively.
For any A Ď Ω, the indicator function of A is defined as, for any x P Ω,
At times, we will slightly abuse notation by saying that 1 A is 1 when event A happens and 0 otherwise. Note that 1 A p¨q " 1t¨P Au. Sets. For any two sets A and B with additive and multiplicative structures, let A`B and A¨B denote the Minkowski sum and Minkowski product of them which are defined as
respectively. If A " txu is a singleton set, we write x`B and x¨B for txu`B and txu¨B. For M P Z ą0 , we let rM s denote the set of first M positive integers t1, 2,¨¨¨, M u. Geometry. Let }¨} 2 denote the Euclidean/L 2 -norm. Specifically, for any x P R n ,
Let Vol n p¨q denote the n-dimensional Lebesgue volume of an Euclidean body (set with nonempty interior). Specifically, for any Euclidean body A Ď R n ,
where dx denotes the differential of x with respect to (w.r.t.) the Lebesgue measure on R n . For convenience, the subscript for dimension will be dropped if no confusion will be caused.
An pn´1q-dimensional Euclidean sphere centered at x of radius r is denoted by S n´1 px, rq :"
) .
An n-dimensional Euclidean ball centered at x of radius r is denoted by B n px, rq :"
We will drop the superscript for dimension when they are clear from the context. When the center of the ball or sphere is not important, we also drop the first argument. Let V n :" Vol n pB n p0, 1qq. Information theory. We use Hp¨q to interchangeably denote the binary entropy function and the (differential or discrete) Shannon entropy; the exact meaning will be clear from the context. In particular, if P x : R n Ñ R ě0 is the p.d.f. of a random vector x in R n , Hpxq denotes the differential entropy of x " P x ,
If X is a discrete set, and P x : X n Ñ r0, 1s is the p.m.f. of a random vector x on X n , Hpxq denotes the Shannon entropy of x " P x ,
For any p P r0, 1s, Hppq denotes the binary entropy
The same convention is followed for mutual information. 6 V. PRELIMINARIES Algebraic inequalities.
Fact 7. For any x ě 0, logp1´xq ď´x and logp1`xq ď 2x. For any 0 ď x ď 1{2, logp1´xq ě´2x. For any 0 ď x ď 1, logp1`xq ě x.
Fact 8. For any x ě´1 and L R p0, 1q, p1´xq L ě 1´Lx. For any x P r0, 1s and any L P Z ě0 , p1´xq L ď 1 1`Lx . Corollary 9. For any a, b ě 0, 0 ď ε ď a{2 and δ ě 0, we have
Proof.
where Inequality (V.1) follows from Fact 7 since 2ε{a ď 1{2 by assumption.
Probability.
Fact 10. For any events A and E, Pr rAs ď Pr rEs`Pr rA X E c s.
Lemma 11 (Markov's inequality). If X is a nonnegative random variable, then for any a ą 0, Pr rX ě as ď E rXs {a.
Lemma 12 (Chernoff bound). Suppose X 1 ,¨¨¨, X N is a sequence of N t0, 1u-valued independent random variables. Let X :" ř N i"1 X i . Then for any δ P r0, 1s,
Then we have
Pr rf pX 1 ,¨¨¨, X N q ą p1`δqE rf ss ď exp˜´2
Pr rf pX 1 ,¨¨¨, X N q ă p1´δqE rf ss ď exp˜´2
Pr rf pX 1 ,¨¨¨, X N q R p1˘δqE rf ss ď2 exp˜´2
Lemma 17 (First mean value theorem for integrals).
Let Ω Ă R n be a closed set. Let f : Ω Ñ R be a continuous function and g : Ω Ñ R be a integrable function that does not change sign. Then there exists x P Ω such that ż
Geometry.
Fact 18. Vn´1 Vn -a n 2π .
Fact 19. VolpB n prqq " V n r n and V n -1
? πn p2πe{nq n{2 .
The following lemma can be used to estimate the number of lattice points in any convex body, whose proof is along the lines of [OE16] .
Lemma 20. For any body K Ă R n and a lattice Λ, the number of lattice point in K is upper and lower bounded by
where q K :" tx P K : dpx, BKq ě r cov pΛqu , p K :"K`VpΛq.
Lemma 21. Let Λ 0 ď R n be a full rank lattice. Then for any y P R n and any r ą r cov pΛ 0 q{q, Proof.
where Inequality (V.3) follows from Corollary 13 by noting that
Inequalities (V.2) and (V.4) are by Lemma 20.
Information theory. The following inequalities are standard in information theory.
Lemma 23 (Cardinality bound). If X is a random variable distributed on a finite set X , then HpXq ď log |X |.
Lemma 24 (Entropy vs. variance bound). If X is a real-valued random variable, then HpXq ď 1 2 logp2πeVar rXsq. Lemma 25 (Fano's inequality). If X Ñ Y Ñ p X is a Markov chain where X is distributed on r2 nR s, then HpX|Y q ď HpX| p Xq ď 1`Pr
Lemma 26 (Data processing inequality). If X Ø Y Ø Z form a Markov chain, then IpX; Zq ď IpY ; Zq.
Definition 1 (Quadratically constrained myopic adversarial channel). A pP, σ 2 , N q-quadratically constrained myopic adversarial channel takes as input x m which encodes m P M subject to power constraint }x} 2 ď ? nP . The transmitted codeword x is also broadcast through a AWGNpP, σ 2 q channel and James receives z " x`s z where s z " N p0, σ 2 I n q. Based on z and the codebook C " tx m u mPM (which is known to every party), James designs an adversarial noise vector s subject to power constrant }s} 2 ď ? nN . Once s is transmitted, the channel adds it to x and outputs y " x`s P B n`0 , ? nP`?nN˘. Bob receiving y is required to reliably decode to the message corresponding to s.
Definition 2 (List decodability of Euclidean codes). A code C " tx i u iPM Ď R n is said to be pP, N, Lq-list decodable for some P, N ą 0 and L P Z ą0 if }x i } 2 ď ? nP for every i P M and for any y P R n ,ˇˇC X B n`y , ? nN˘ˇˇď L.
Definition 3 (List decodability of infinite lattices). An infinite lattice Λ ď R n is said to be pN, Lq-list decodable for some N ą 0 and L P Z ą0 if for every y P R n ,ˇˇΛ X B n`y , ? nN˘ˇˇď L.
Definition 4 (Normalized logarithmic density). Let Λ ď R n be an infinite lattice. The density of Λ is defined as ∆pΛq -lim sup nÑ8 |Λ X r0, aq n | a n .
With slight abuse of notation, the normalized logarithmic density (NLD) of Λ is defined as RpΛq -1 n log ∆pΛq. NLD measure the "rate" of a lattice.
VI. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This paper is concerned with the following communication scenario. Two transmitters Alice and Bob want to exchange their messages m A and m B over a noisy channel governed by an adversary James. Specifically, we assume m A and m B are uniformly distributed in Alice's and Bob's message sets M and W, respectively. To fight against the adversarial noise to be introduced by James, Alice encodes her message into a length-n real-valued vector x A :" x m A satisfying }x A } 2 ď ? nP A for some channel parameter P A ą 0. Similarly, Bob is allowed to encode his message into a codeword x B :" x m B satisfying }x B } 2 ď ? nP B for some P B ą 0. By Kerckhoffs's principle, we assume that codebooks (collection of codewords) used by Alice and Bob are known to every party in the system. Codewords x A and x B are transmitted and added in the channel. James gets to know the sum z :" x A`xB . Based on his observation, James designs adversarial vectors s A and s B such that }s A } 2 ď ? nN A and }s B } 2 ď ? nN B for some N A ą 0 and N B ą 0, respectively. Once s A and s B are fed into the channel, Alice receives y A :" z`s A and Bob receives y B :" z`s B . The goal for Alice/Bob is to reliably decode the other transmitter Bob's/Alice's message w.h.p. over m A and m B .
The channel model is depicted in Fig. 1 . Fig. 1 : A quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel. In our proof, we assume P A " P B " P and N A " N B " N . All of our results can be easily extended to the general asymmetric case.
Definition 5 (Quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel). A pP A , P B , N A , N B q-quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel is a function pair pW A , W B q,
Here s A and s B are outputs of an arbitrary jamming map pair pJam A , Jam B q of the following form,
Note that both Jam A and Jam B can depend on pC A , C B q.
Remark 1. Throughout this paper, we focus on the symmetric case where P A " P B " P and N A " N B " N . Such channels are denoted by pP, N q-quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channels for short. All results can be trivially extended to the asymmetric case. We will state the extension without proof.
The dimension n is called the blocklength of the code. Let M :" |M| and W :" |W|. The message sets M and W are identified with rM s and rW s, respectively. The rate of a code pC A , C B q is defined as a pair pR A , R B q where R A " RpC A q :" log M n and R B " RpC B q :" log W n . At times, we also abuse the notation and call the collection of codewords (images of the encoding maps) codebooks, i.e., C A :" x A,m ( M m"1 , and C B :" x B,w ( W w"1 . Definition 7 (Average probability of error). The average probability of error of a codebook pair pC A , C B q associated with pEnc A , Enc B , Dec A , Dec B q used over a pP A , P B , N A , N B q-quadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel is defined as
where the probabilities are taken over uniform selection of m A and m B .
Definition 8 (Achievable rate). A rate pair pR A , R B q is said to be achievable if for any constant β 1 , β 2 ą 0 and ε 1 , ε 2 ą 0, there exists a sequence of codes tpC A,n , C B,n qu n for infinitely many n such that, there is an n 0 , for every n ą n 0 ,
‚ the probabilities of Alice's and Bob's decoding errors vanish in n, P e,A pC A,n , C B,n q ďε 1 , P e,B pC A,n , C B,n q ďε 2 .
Definition 9 (Capacity). The capacity pC A , C B q of a pP A , P B , N A , N Buadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel is defined as the supremum of all achievable rates,
RpC A,n q,
RpC B,n q.
VII. BEYOND LIST DECODING CAPACITY: MODIFIED DECODING RULES
Naively following the proof strategy in [JL17] , we cannot prove any achievable rate that is larger than the list decoding capacity 1 2 log P N above which the list size of any code has to be exponential in the blocklength n.
A. Decoding rule (informal)
Bob computes
If there is a single codeword
then the decoder outputs the message associated to x A . Otherwise, it declares an error. Alice's decoder operates likewise.
B. Intuition
We provide intuition behind our posterior-estimation-style decoding rule. All slack factors will be omitted in the rough calculations in this section.
Before proceeding, we would like to remind the readers of a fact from high dimensional geometry: as long as the r cov pΛq is sufficiently small, a random lattice point in a ball is concentrated near the surface of the ball and is approximately orthogonal to any given vector.
Suppose a random pair of x A and x B is transmitted. They are concentrated in a thin shell near the sphere S n´1 p0, ? nP q and are almost orthogonal with high probability. Consider Bob trying to decode. Alice's decoding rule is symmetric. Bob receives y B " x A`xB`sB . From James' view, he observes z " x A`xB which has norm about ? 2nP w.h.p. There is a large number of pairs of px A , x B q which sums up to z. Moreover, each pair is approximately orthogonal and each of x A and x B is approximately uniformly distributed in a thin strip of radius a nP {2 perpendicular to z. James' jamming vector can be generically decomposed into directions parallel and perpendicular to z,
He has to choose α so that s B does not violate his power constraint,
This imposes a constrain on α: |α| ď b N 2P . Under this decomposition, Bob's received word can be written as y B -p1´αqx A`p 1´αqx B`sK . From James' view, if z is typical (i.e., }z} 2 P a 2α 2 P p1˘δq), there is a large number of pairs of codewords px A , x B q that were potentially transmitted (i.e., x A`xB " z). Furthermore, these codewords are uniformly distributed in a thin strip T near the surface of B n`0 , ? nP˘, orthogonal to z, of radius approximately a nP {2. (See Fig. 8a for the geometry.) Hence the value of
Thereby the value of α that was chosen by James can be well estimated by Bob via estimator
Then Bob computes y B´p 1´p αqx B which in turn well approximates p1´αqx A`sK . We now observe that, once James receives z and instantiates his jamming vector s based on z, the effective channel to Bob is essentially
It turns out that x A and s K are almost orthogonal w.h.p. Let r P :" p1´αq 2 P . Assuming James used up all his power (which is the worst case for Bob), let r N :" N´2α 2 P . For any A Ă R n , let r A denote p1´αqA. One can compute the typical radius of the decoding region induced by r gives that under the worst jamming strategy that James can impose, the rate 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘c an be achieved. (The maximizer α˚turns out to be N 2P .) This optimization problem coincides with the one that shows up in our converse.
C. Some remarks
Let us examine what Bob gains by running the above decoder. Consider the worst channel to Bob that James could instantiate, which, in hindsight, corresponds to α being α˚-N 2P . The original channel is y B " x A`xB`sB . Naively cancelling his signal x B , Bob gets r r y B -x A`sB . Being over-pessimistic and assuming worst-case s B , one would expect the SNR to be Ć Ć SNR -P {N and only 1 2 log P N (which coincides with the pP, N q-list-decoding capacity) could be achieved. However, by running the above decoder, Bob in fact gets the effective channel
Scaling everything back by 1 1´α˚, Bob gets x A`2 P 2P´N s K . Note that s K typically has power
The effective SNR is hence
At this point, it seems that our reduction can only lead to achievable rate 1 2 log Ć SNR " 1 2 log`P N´1 2˘, which is, somewhat counterintuitively, even less than the naive 1 2 log P N . However, it turns out that though s K comes from an adversarial noise s B , Bob can actually achieve 1 2 log´1`Ć SNR¯, as if s K was a Gaussian of the same variance. The miracle is essentially due to the fact that James only gets to observe z, rather than individual signals x A and x B . As a consequence of measure concentration, the average/typical effective decoding radius s K has much lower power:
Therefore the average/typical effective SNR is
Now Bob is in a good shape and he could transmit at theˆP,´2 P 2P´N¯2 N˙-list-decoding capacity:
3) In [JL17] , it is claimed that when R ą 1{2, random codes also achieve capacity. This is not true for the quadratically constrained case. No matter how large the SNR is, we cannot use a random spherical/ball code. We have to use codes with linear structures. This is because if codewords are independently and uniformly distributed in B n`0 , ? nP˘, then given z " x 1`x2 , with probability 1, px 1 , x 2 q is the unique pair of codewords that sum up to z. Then James knows x 1 and x 2 and is hence omniscient. 4) In general, suppose that Alice and Bob have power constraints P A and P B , respectively, and the noise vectors to them are subject to power constraints N A and N B , respectively. Assume that N B ă P A`PB , otherwise C A " C B " 0, obviously. Consider Bob. Following exactly the same proof, in the high-SNR regime, the rate given by the following optimization can be achieved.
Solving it, we have the maximizer α˚" N B P A`PB and the maxima is
Exactly the same optimization also shows up in the scale-and-babble converse. Hence the above expression is the capacity of user Bob in the high-SNR regime.
Similarly, if we consider Alice, by the same calculations, we get the capacity for user Alice
VIII. ACHIEVABILITY A. Code design
Let Λ be a lattice obtained by lifting random linear codes C 1 over F q via Construction-A. Specifically, let G " F nˆk q be a uniformly ranodm matrix. The field size q and dimension k will be fixed later. Define the random linear code generated by G as C 1 " GF k q . Define Λ " 1 q ΦpC 1 q`Z n , where Φ : F q Ñ Z is the natural embedding which maps any field element j P F q to an integer j P Z. One can easily check that Λ is indeed a lattice. Our lattice code is finally defined as C :" Λ X B n`0 , ? nP˘. It was proved in [ELZ05] that the above ensemble of lattices is good for covering w.h.p.
Lemma 27 (Theorem 2, [ELZ05] ). Let Λ be a lattice randomly drawn from the ensemble defined above whose parameters are restricted as follows. Let q and k be such that
Fix r eff pΛq to a constant. Let k ď p1´cqn for some constant c P p0, 1q and k " ωplog 2 nq. This in turn imposes constraints on q, q " ωp ? nq and log q " opn{ log nq. Define dpnq :"
? n 2q . Then Λ is good for covering w.h.p.,
where f pnq ą 1 is defined as f pnq :"ˆr cov pΛq r cov pΛq´2dpnq˙n λ{n 2 plog n`log log q`1q log q n ,
for some fixed constant λ ą 0; in the RHS of Eqn. (VIII.1), νpnq is defined as νpnq :"2 logplog n`log log qq.
Remark 2. As n approaches infinity, by the choice of dpnq nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 0, for any constant λ ą 0 and by the choice of q, respectively, we have r cov pΛq r cov pΛq´2dpnq Ñ1, n λ{n Ñ1,
Hence f pnq nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 1. That is, r cov pΛq{r eff pΛq " 1`o n p1q and Λ is good for covering. Also, note that, by the choice of νpnq and p, the RHS of Eqn. (VIII.1) approaches 1 from left as n Ñ 8, p1´2´ν pnq qp1´2´ν pnq`1 q log n`log log q Ñ1.
Hence the covering goodness property holds w.h.p. Remark 3. Under the above choices of parameters, there are superexponentially many lattice points in the unit cube r0, 1s n (and any of its integer translation r0, 1s n`a where a P Z n ). For the purpose of coding, it is desirable to have exponentially many lattice points to keep the rate fixed. Indeed, we will scale Λ properly momentarily.
For the convenience of future calculations, define r cov pΛq :"
? nω and r eff pΛq :"
where β 0 :" β`β 2`β3 and β, β 2 , β 3 will be defined in Sec. VIII-F (see Eqn. (VIII.53), (VIII.54) and (VIII.55)). SincěˇˇΛ
For large SNR and covering-good Λ (such that ω « τ ), Eqn. (VIII.4) implies that τ « N , i.e., r eff pΛq « ? nN . Note that scaling does not change covering goodness since r cov pΛq and r eff pΛq (and r pack pΛq) are scaling homogeneous, i.e., r cov paΛq " ar eff pΛq, r eff paΛq " ar eff pΛq for any a ą 0.
Let ε 1 n ą 0 be a function such that ε n nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 0 and the decaying speed is lower than that of f pnq´1 (by Lemma 27, we know that f pnq´1 ą 0 and f pnq´1 nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 0). Then, by Lemma 27, w.h.p. a random lattice from the above ensemble satisfies r cov pΛq r eff pΛq "
or ω{τ " 1`ε n , for ε n :" 2ε 1 n`ε 12 n Ñ 0. Over the randomness of picking q-ary linear codes, it was shown in [ZV19] that the infinite lattice Λ is list decodable.
Lemma 28 ([ZV19]
). Let Λ be a lattice randomly drawn from the ensemble defined above whose parameters are restricted as follows. Let
where r P 1 and r N 1 are given by Eqn. (VIII.52) and Eqn. (VIII.51), respectively, and L :" 2 Op 1
Remark 4. If we take r eff pΛq " ? nN 2 β , then the density of Λ is
Hence pN, Lq-list decodable lattices can achieve NLD
and list size L " 2 Op 1 β log 2 1 β q . Remark 5. For small constant β ą 0, q scales as Op1{βq and k scales as O´n{ log 1 β¯. Our choice of parameters falls into the regime specified in Lemma 27 after proper scaling. Remark 6. Roughly speaking,
Note that, by setting α " N 2P , they can be written as r P 1 « p1´αq 2 P and r N 1 « N´2α 2 P . In fact, the list-decoding capacity 1 2 log r P 1 Ă N 1´β happen to equal the two-way adversarial channel capacity 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘´β 2´β3´β under the above choices of r P 1 and r N 1 . This coincidence matches our intuition in Sec. VII.
By union bound, w.h.p. a random lattice from the above ensemble is simultaneously good for covering and p r P 1 , r N 1 , Lq-list decodable. Fix Λ to be any of such lattice.
Given two identical copies of C, independently expurgate them and get C A and C B as Alice's and Bob's codebooks, respectively. Specifically, each codeword in C is independently picked into C A with probability 2´γ n for certain sufficiently small constant γ ą 0. Bob's codebook C B is obtained in the same manner independently. By Chernoff bound (Corollary 13), we have that |C A | and |C B | are at least 1 2¨2 1 2 logp 1 2`P N q´β0´γ with probability doubly exponentially close to 1. The rate incurs essentially no loss if γ is sufficiently small. Remark 7. In the proof in subsequent sections, the probability is only taken over message selection m A " M, m " W and the expurgation process. The base lattice Λ is fixed throughout the paper.
B. Error events

Take a
? nη 1 -net S of B n`0 , ? nN˘such that for every s P B n`0 , ? nN˘, there is s 1 P S satisfying }s´s 1 } 2 ď ? nη 1 . We can take a lattice Λ S of covering radius ? nη 1 . If Λ S is good for covering, then the size of the net S is at most
E len The transmitted x A or x B is not close to the surface of the codebook,
.
(VIII.5) E ip The transmitted codewords x A and x B are not approximately orthogonal,
E z The sum of transmitted codeword pair x A and x B has length deviating from its typical value ? 2nP ,
(VIII.7) a n r N " a npN´2α 2 P q,
The union of E len , E ip and E z , i.e., the transmitted x A and x B are not jointly typical,
(VIII.10) E T Codeword pairs px A , x B q which sum up to z are not in a thin strip T which will be defined later,
in the strip have norm much less than ? nP ,
(VIII.12) E 2 Codeword pairs px A , x B q in the strip T that sum up to James' observation z are not approximately orthogonal,
Here s K " proj z K psq is the projection of s to the subspace orthogonal to z. E 1 The union of E 1 , E 2 and E 3 , i.e., codewords x A , x B in the strip T and any given s K are not jointly typical,
the true value α used by James,
Here α is the fractional length of s along the direction of z, i.e., › › proj z psq › › 2 " α }z} 2 E dec-rad Bob's estimate of decoding radius w.r.t. the effective channel deviates from its typical value a n r N .
(VIII.17)
E avg-rad The (normalized) effective decoding radius deviates from its typical value (averaged over the strip)
The dependencies among the above events are plotted in Fig. 2 
We would like to point out that most "good" events are implied purely by E c z . The proofs mostly follow from geometric arguments.
In 
C. Sumset property
For notational convenience, we write r eff " r eff pΛq and r cov " r cov pΛq. Proof.
Pr Geometrically (Fig. 3) , B 1 and B 2 are the blue and pink cones restricted to the ball B. Then
We apply Lemma 20 to upper bound the numerator and lower bound the denominator. To this end, we only need to upper bound the volume of { B 1 Y B 2 which is at most 2 Volp p B 1 q. Proof.
Pr r|xx A , x B y| ě nP ζs " Pr "
where the last inequality is by Lemma 30.
Lemma 32. Let x A , x B be random lattice points sampled uniformly and independently from C. Then z :" x A`xB has norm approximately ? 2nP w.h.p. For any constant δ P p0, 1q, λ P p0, δq, let ζ :" δ´λ.
Then
The first term, by Lemma 29, is at most
The second term is at most Corollary 33. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Let x A and x B be two random lattice points independently and uniformly sampled from C. Let z :" x A`xB and s K :" proj z K psq. Then the norm of s K is concentrated around a npN´2α 2 P q w.h.p. For any δ P p0, 1q, 
where C 1 " C 1 pP q and c ω,δ are positive constants to be defined later. In particular c ω,δ ω,δÑ0
Ý ÝÝÝ Ñ 0.
Remark 8. For future convenience, let F 1 ą 0 be the largest constant such that
It suffices to take
Note that F 1 τ Ñ0
Ý ÝÝ Ñ 8. Remark 9. For readers who are familiar with the myopic channel model [ZVJS18b] , we would like to take this opportunity to point out that, as opposed to the myopic case where the uncertain codewords from James' perspective are approximately uniformly distributed in his uncertainty set (which was named an oracle-given set of thickness only Opplog nq{nq), in our case the uncertain codewords are exactly uniformly distributed on UFO X Λ given James' observation z.
Proof. First note that for each x A P C, there is a unique x B P C such that x A`xB " z. Indeed, such an x B is given by 
in Eqn. (VIII.24) and (VIII.26), respectively.
Lemma 35. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Among those pairs
most are in a thin strip T (to be precisely defined in the proof) of radius approximately a nP {2 perpendicular to z,
and c ε , c 3,ω and c 4,ω to be defined later satisfy c ε εÑ0 Ý ÝÝ Ñ 0 and c 3,ω , c 4,ω ωÑ0 Ý ÝÝ Ñ 0.
Remark 10. For future convenience, take the largest constant f 1 ą 0 such that
Proof. We will show that the volume of UFO is concentrated around a thin strip T (to be defined momentarily) on the equator of UFO, so are the lattice points therein. We slice UFO into many layers each of height ? nε for some small constant ε ą 0. Obviously, the layer with the largest volume is the one in the middle, denoted by F. Formally F is defined as
Note that the disk F has radius
We further take a strip T around the boundary of F,
where B n´1 p0, r ? 1´ρqˆR denotes an infinitely high cylinder of radius r ? 1´ρ, centered around 0, along the direction of z. See Fig. 5a for the construction of F and T . We emphasize that there are two thickness parameters associated to T : ρ -(a) Strip T is defined as the thin pink band around the equator of UFO. The blue region denotes a thin disk F . (normalized) thickness along the radius of F; ε -(normalized) thickness perpendicular to the radius of F. We want to show that there is a large (exponential) number of lattice points in T . To this end, it suffices to upper bound the number of lattice points in UFO but outside T . Indeed, UFOzT consists of two parts:
which is the blue disk in Fig. 5a, and where we define, for notational convenience,
P´a2P p1´δq´?ε¯?ω ď2 ?
P ω, c 1 :"P δ{2`c ε`cω .
Combining bounds (VIII.28), (VIII.29), (VIII.31) and (VIII.25), we have that the probability that a uniformly lattice point in UFO falls outside T is given by
(VIII.33)
Observe that in Expression (VIII.32), 2P ω`ω in the numerator vanishes as ω Ñ 0. Also, c ω,δ in the denominator of both Expression (VIII.32) and (VIII.33) vanishes as ω, δ Ñ 0. By taking ρ, ε " ω, δ, we can make the bounds (VIII.32) and (VIII.33) exponentially small in total. This finishes the proof.
Lemma 36. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. All pairs of codewords x A , x B in T that sum up to z are almost orthogonal,
Remark 11. It is easy to verify that pρ`δqP´ρP p1`δq{2 p1´ρqP`ρP p1`δq{2 ą δ. For future convenience, define θ :" pρ`δqP´ρP p1`δq{2 p1´ρqP`ρP p1`δq{2 . The above bound can be relaxed toˇˇcos = x,x 1ˇď θ.
Proof. We will show that any two points (not necessarily in Λ) x, x 1 in T are almost orthogonal. Define
It turns out that, as depicted in Fig. 6a , for any x and x 1 in T such that x`x 1 " z, cosp= min q ď cosp= max T q ď cosp= x,x 1 q ď cosp= min T q ď´cosp= max q, The extremal angles = max and = min are given by To see that = max and = min are indeed extremal angles, see Fig. 6a . For x and x 1 in the strip T (i.e., the light pink region in Fig. 6a ) which sum up to z, they form a triangle ∆OO 1 A. We are interested in determining the maximum and minimum possible angles between such x and x 1 . It is not hard to see that = x,x 1 " 180˝´=OAO 1 . Hence cosp= x,x 1 q "´cosp=OAO 1 q and it suffices to bound =OAO 1 . Let
For any apex A, all apexes A 1 s which are on the same circle determined by O, O 1 and A give the same angle =OA 1 O 1 " =OAO 1 . Hence, without loss of generality, we focus on A which is on the radius of the strip T . Thereby, ∆OAO 1 is isosceles: OA " O 1 A. Now it is easy to see that = min and = max are given by A and A, respectively in Fig. 6a .
The following corollary follows directly from Lemma 36.
Corollary 37. For z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq, codewords x A , x B P T such that x A`xB " z satisfy |xx A , x B y| ď nP θ. Lemma 39. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. If x is uniformly distributed in T X Λ, then it is approximately orthogonal to s K w.h.p., where s K :" proj z K psq,
where ζ 1 :" ζ P N . Remark 12. For future convenience, take the largest constant f 2 ą 0 such that
Pr
x"T XΛ r|xx, s K y| ě nζs " |tx P Λ X T : |xx, s K y| ě nζu| |Λ X T | .
(VIII.39)
The set T 1 :" T X tx P R n : |xx, s K y| ě nζu is the intersection of two halfspaces (that are symmetric around z) and T . (In Fig. 7 , the pink region represents T and the red subset of T represents T 1 .) The above probability (Expression (VIII.39)) can be written as
We already have a lower bound on Volp } UFOq. We now upper bound Volp p T 1 q.
where r 3 is the radius of T 1 given by
1´ζ 12 , (VIII.41) where ζ 1 :" ζ P N . See Fig. 7 for the geometry behind the calculations. Therefore, by Eqn. (VIII.25), (VIII.30) and (VIII.40), (VIII.41),
Note that by taking ζ " δ, ω, the above bound is exponentially small. Lemma 40. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Assume E 1c holds. Then p α is a good estimate of α, i.e., p α P α˘ξ, where ξ ě ζ`p1´αqpP θ`c 2 q{P . Proof. By definition of estimator p α :" 1´x
By Corollary 37, if x A and x B that sum up to z fall into T , then they are approximately orthogonal |xx A , x B y| ď nP θ. Moreover, by Corollary 38, their norms are concentrated around ? nP , i.e., }x A } 2 2 P rnpP´c 2 q, nP s and }x B } 2 2 P rnpPć 2 q, nP s. Also, for any given α such that proj z ps 1 q "´αz and the induced s K " proj z K ps 1 q, we have |xx B , s K y| ď nζ w.h.p. by Lemma 39. Now we are ready to bound the estimation error of p α.
The last Inequality (VIII.44) follows since
2`x x B , s K y ď p1´αqnP θ`p1´αqnP`nζ. By setting parameters properly, the above interval lies inside the interval nP p1´α˘ξq. Indeed, set ξ such that "´p 1´αqP θ`p1´αqpP´c 2 q´ζ ě P p1´α´ξq p1´αqP θ`p1´αqP`ζ ď P p1´α`ξq , or " ζ ď P ξ´p1´αqpP θ`c 2 q ζ ď P ξ´p1´αqP θ .
It suffices to set ζ ďP ξ´p1´αqpP θ`c 2 q, or ξ ě ζ`p1´αqpP θ`c 2 q P .
E. Estimating effective decoding radius
The analysis in the previous section implies that p α :" 1´x y B ,x B y nP is a good estimate to α used by James. It further implies that, from James' perspective, after Bob cancels his own (scaled) signal, Bob effectively receives
which is approximately equal to p1´αqx A`sK w.h.p., where r x A :" p1´αqx A is uniformly distributed in the strip scaled by 1´α. Such r
x A 's are translated by s K (which is perpendicular to z) and Bob's effective received vector is r y B :" r x A`sK . The geometry of the effective channel is shown in Fig. 8a . In fact, the effective decoding radius }s K } 2 can also be well estimated by Bob. Indeed, we have,
where Eqn. (VIII.45) heuristically holds w.h.p. Hence we equip Bob with the following estimator for }s K } 2 ,
Note that James does not have to use up all his power and thus }s} 2 may be less than ? nN . However, the worst case is when }s} 2 "
? nN , which we assume is the case and suffices for upper bounding the decoding error probability. We now bound the estimation error of }x s K } 2 .
Lemma 41. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Assume E 1c holds. Then }x s K } 2 2 P }s K } 2 2˘n µ, where µ ě 2 max " c 2 p1´αq 2`ζ 2 P`2 p1´αqζp1`θq`P p1´αq 2 θp3`θq, p1´αqˆ´c 2 2 p1´αq P`2 c 2 p1´αqp1´θq`3P p1´αqθ`2ζp1`θq˙* .
Proof. By definition of the estimator, we have
To simplify notation in the following calculations, define B :" xx B , s K y {n. Then we claim that
(VIII.46) (a) The effective channel to Bob is r y B " r x A`sK . The pink band denotes the scaled strip r T -p1´αqT .
(b) The average (over uncertain codewords r x A P r T ) effective decoding radius of Bob can be computed from the geometry. Fig. 8 : The geometry of the effective channel and the geometry of computation of average effective decoding radius.
2p1´αq 2 npP´c 2 q´2p1´αq 2 nP θ´2 nP`p 1´αq 2`p nP θq 2`p nP q 2`2 nP θ¨nP˘`2p1´αqpnP θ`nP qnζ`pnζq 2˘, 2p1´αq 2 nP`2p1´αq 2 nP θ´2 nP`p 1´αq 2`p npP´c 22´2 nP θ¨npP´c 2 q˘´2p1´αqpnP θ`nP qnζ˘ .
By taking proper values of parameters, the above interval is inside the interval r´nµ, nµs. Indeed, we take µ such that " 2p1´αq 2 pP´c 2 q´2p1´αq 2 P θ´2 P`p 1´αq 2 pP 2 θ 2`P 2`2 P 2 θq`2p1´αqpP θ`P qζ`ζ 2˘ě´µ 2p1´αq 2 P`2p1´αq 2 P θ´2 P`p 1´αq 2 ppP´c 2 q 2´2 P θpP´c 2 qq´2p1´αqpP θ`P qζ˘ď µ , (VIII.47) or µ ě 2 max " c 2 p1´αq 2`ζ 2 P`2 p1´αqζp1`θq`P p1´αq 2 θp3`θq, p1´αqˆ´c 2 2 p1´αq P`2 c 2 p1´αqp1´θq`3P p1´αqθ`2ζp1`θq˙* .
Note that
. Hence by Corollary 33 and Lemma 41, we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 42. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Assume E 1c and E c sK hold. Then James' estimate }x s K } 2 is concentrated around the typical value a n r N of the correct decoding radius }s K } 2 , i.e., }x s K } 2 P a npN´2α 2 P p1¯δq˘µq.
F. Setting the rate Note that y B´p 1´αqx B " p1´αqx A`sK . Hence the effective channel is essentially r y B " r x A`sK , where r x A :" p1´αqx A . To decode, Bob computes
The error terms are bounded as follows.
Bob scales C A by 1´p α and sets his (normalized) decoding radius to
The power of r
Note that since c 2 Ñ 0 as ρ, ε Ñ 0, we get that β 1 vanishes as θ, ρ, ε and ζ all approach 0. Let C A operate at rate
where Inequality (VIII.53) follows from Corollary 9 by setting ε and δ in the corollary to ε Ðξp2p1´αq´ξqP`c 2 p1´α´ξq 2 , δ Ð2α 2 P δ`µ`β 2 1`2 a N´2α 2 P p1´δq`µβ 1 .
In Inequality (VIII.53), we also defined
Ý ÝÝÝ Ñ 0 and β 1 θ,ρ,ε,ζ Ý ÝÝÝ Ñ 0, we have that β 2 vanishes as ξ, ρ and ε approach 0, and β 3 vanishes as δ, µ, θ, ρ, ε and ζ all approach 0.
For future convenience, let C α :" 1 2 log p1´αq 2 P N´2α 2 P .
By the above configuration of parameters and by the choice of Λ in Sec. VIII-A, Λ, thereby C, is´r P 1 , r N 1 , L¯-list decodable, where L " 2 Op 1 β log 2 1 β q .
G. Computing average effective decoding radius
In this section, we argue that, for any s P S n´1 p0, ? nN q, the radius of the decoding region is concentrated around its typical value w.h.p. over James' uncertainty in the strip T .
Define random variable r such that radius´B n´r y B , }s K } 2¯X B n´0 , a n r P¯¯" ? nr.
As shown in Fig. 8b , from the geometry, we have, on the one hand,
on the other hand,
By pcos θq 2`p sin θq 2 " 1, we obtain
‚.
Note that heuristically, w.h.p. r approximately equals r « r P¨1´´n r P`0¯2 n r P`n r N`0¯n r P‹ ‚ " r P¨1´r P 2 r P`r N¯r P‚ " r P r N r P`r N .
However,in reality, Bob does not have direct access to the parameters of the effective channel. From Bob's perspective, the input of the effective channel is r x 1 A " p1´p αqx A of power p P 1 and the effective channel noise is x s K 1 which is perpendicular
which is a robust version of r that takes estimation errors into account. We then argue that the above channel parameters are close to the underlying typical values w.h.p.
Lemma 43. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Assume E 1c holds. Then Bob's estimate of the (normalized) average effective decoding radius p r is concentrated around the underlying typical value Here c δ,µ :" 2α 2 P δ`µ Ñ 0, as δ, µ Ñ 0, e x " e x pρ, ε, ξq Ñ 0, as ρ, ε, ξ Ñ 0, e s " e s pθ, ρ, ε, ζ, µq Ñ 0, as θ, ρ, ε, ζ, µ Ñ 0, e 1 " e 1 pζ, θ, ρ, ε, ξq Ñ 0, as ζ, θ, ρ, ε, ξ Ñ 0.
Proof. Let x s K 1 " s K`es where e s is an estimation error vector. To bound the norm of e s , note that on the one hand 1 nˇˇˇ›
On the other hand, the largest possible difference between }s K`es } 2 2 and }s K } 2 2 išˇˇ}
if we write r
The average decoding radius computed w.r.t. Bob's estimated channel parameters is we defined e 1 :" ζ`?P e s`? N e x`? e s e x .
We set ν such that the above interval is a subinterval of 
H. Expurgation
By now, all lemmas are proved w.r.t. C without expurgation. All bounds are only over the randomness of message selection. However, Lemma 22 shows that, if the expurgation parameter γ and the packing/covering radius parameters τ and ω are sufficiently small, properties shown in previous sections continue to hold with probability doubly exponentially close to 1 over the expurgation process of C A and C B . Specifically, invoking Lemma 22, we have the following post-expurgation versions of the lemmas we have proved so far. We state them without proof.
Lemma 44. Suppose that γ, τ, ω are all sufficiently small. Then the following bounds hold. They are post-expurgation analogs of (pre-expurgation) bounds on probability (over message selection) of E len , E ip , E z , and E sK . Fix z P C A`CB such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Then the following bounds hold. They are postexpurgation analogs of bounds on E ' , E T and E 3 . Events E c 1 and E c 2 are geometric consequences of the construction of the strip T and will not be affected by expurgation.
Events E c α , E c dec-rad and E c avg-rad follow from E 1c and E c sK and will be not affected by expurgation as long as E 1c and E c sK hold after expurgation.
I. Bounding probability of error
Let T good (T bad :" T zT good ) denote the subset of T in which codewords induce typical (atypical) radii of decoding regions under x s K 1 assuming these codewords were transmitted. The probability that the transmitted x A falls into T bad is exponentially small. For those x A in T good , by list decodability, the number of codewords i n balls centered around any x A P T good of radius a n r N 1 is at most L. After expurgation with probability 1´2´γ n , in expectation, the number of codewords in the decoding ball is at most L2´γ n . To get doubly exponential concentration (which admits a union bound over s 1 P S), we invoke McDiarmid's inequality and show that with probability 1´2´Ω p2 n q over expurgation, the fraction of codewords in T good that suffer decoding errors (i.e., there exists another codeword in the decoding ball) is exponentially small, or, in 1´2´Ω pnq fraction of decoding balls induced by codewords in T good , there will be no codeword other than the transmitted one that survived the expurgation. The analysis is similar to that in [JL17] .
For any vector x, define r x :" p1´p αqx. For any set V, let r V :" p1´p αqV. Let tx i u M i"1 denote C. Lemma 45. Fix z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq. Fix s P S n´1`0 , ? nN˘. Then the fraction of codewords codewords in T good that may suffer decoding errors is exponentially small with probability doubly exponentially close to 1 over expurgation,
where the outer expectation is taken over expurgation and the inner one is taken over uniform distribution on Ć T good X r C A .
Proof. For z P C`C such that }z} 2 P a 2nP p1˘δq and x s K 1 P B n´0 , a n r N 1¯, consider a directed graph GpC, C A , C B , z, x s K 1 q with vertices V " C. There is an edge
For x A uniformly distributed in T good X C A , the probability that it incurs a decoding error is given by the following ratio |tx A P T good X C A that suffers a decoding erroru|
We first bound the denominator. Before expurgation, by Lemma 34, 35 and 39, we have
by Chernoff bound (Corollary 13), we have
We then bound f pGq. To this end, let us compute the expected value of f pGq. Note that
|T good X C| 2´2 nγ`1´`1´L 2´n γ˘˘( VIII.65)
where Equality (VIII.63) is by linearity of expectation, Equality (VIII.64) follows since C A and C B are obtained by independent expurgation and each codeword is expurgated independently. Inequality (VIII.65) is by Fact 8.
Using Fact 8, we can also get a lower bound on E rf pGqs,
(VIII.67)
We next argue that f is actually Lipschitz. Think the expurgation process as picking each codeword in C independently into C A and C B with probability 2´n γ . Define, for i P rM s,
Note that all X i 's and Y i 's are independent. Now f can be written as
where in Equality (VIII.68), j i P rM s is such that x ji " z´x i , and in Equality (VIII.69), AND and OR are taken over F 2 , but the summation is still taken over Z as usual. For any i, if we flip X i , f can change by at most |f pX 1 ,¨¨¨, X i " 0,¨¨¨, X M , Y 1 ,¨¨¨, Y M q´f pX 1 ,¨¨¨, X i " 1,¨¨¨, X M , Y 1 ,¨¨¨, Y M q| ďL, since x i can lie in the lists of radius a n r N 1 of at most L codewords, corresponding to the third factor of the summand of Eqn. (VIII.69). For any i, if we flip Y i , f can change by at most
since it only appears as the second factor in the summand of Eqn. (VIII.69). Therefore, Lippf q ď L. Now we can apply McDiarmid's inequality (Lemma 16) to get a doubly exponential concentration bound on f .
where Inequalities (VIII.70) and (VIII.71) are by Inequalities (VIII.66) and (VIII.67), respectively; Inequality (VIII.72) is by Inequality (VIII.61). The exponent of bound (VIII.72) can be made exponentially large by taking sufficiently small τ . Indeed, observe that the exponent is at least
To make the exponent 2F 1´Cα´6 γ`β 2`β3`β positive, it suffices to take τ ă 2´p Cα`6´logp P 2´c ω,δ.
Finally, combining Inequalities (VIII.62) and (VIII.72), we have
The proof of achievability can be finished by taking a union bound over s 1 P S where |S| " 2 Opnq .
J. Improved analysis for sumset property
In this section, we show that one can get rid of the technical condition for sumset property that the covering radius of the underlying lattice is small. We prove high-probability bounds over random lattice construction and message selection.
We use a random nested Construction-A lattice pair with fine lattice Λ lifted from a q-ary k-dimensional random linear code and a coarse lattice Λ 0 that is good for covering. Specifically, fix a coarse lattice Λ 0 with r cov pΛ 0 q " ? nP such that r cov pΛ 0 q r eff pΛ 0 q " ? nP r eff pΛ 0 q " 1`ε 1 n , for some ε 1 n nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 0. Choose k such that q k " 2 nR . Let G 1 be a random matrix uniformly distributed in F nˆk q . Define linear code C 1 generated by G 1 as C 1 -G 1 F k q . Define the lattice Λ 1 lifted from C 1 via Construction-A as Λ 1 -1 q ΦpC 1 q`Z n where Φ denotes the natural embedding from F q to Z. Rotate Λ 1 using any generator matrix G 0 of Λ 0 and obtain the fine lattice Λ -G 0 Λ 1 . Finally, define the nested Construction-A lattice code C as C -Λ X VpΛ 0 q. Let φ denote the encoding map associated to C.
Lemma 46. For any ζ P p0, 3{4q and m P 1, 2,¨¨¨, 2 nR ( ,
Proof. Let xφpmq. By code construction, x is uniformly distributed in 1 q Λ 0 X VpΛ 0 q. Therefore, 
where Inequalities (VIII.75) and (VIII.76) follows from Fact 7 and Inequality (VIII.77) is by ζ ă 3{4.
Lemma 47. Fix any ζ P p0, 3{4q. If m 1 , m 2 are two uniform messages from 1, 2,¨¨¨, 2 nR ( , then Pr m1,m2,C "ˇˇc os = φpm1q,φpm2qˇě ζ ‰ ď2¨2´n pζ 2 {2´4{q´ε 1 n q .
Proof. Let x 1 -φpm 1 q, x 2 -φpm 2 q. By the choice of m 1 , m 2 and the code design, x 1 and x 2 are independent and uniformly distributed in 1 q Λ 0 X VpΛ 0 q. For any x P V, define a cone T x as T x :" v P R n :ˇˇ= x,vˇě ζ ( .
Now,
Pr
where Inequalities (VIII.78) and (VIII.79) are illustrated in Fig. 9 and x 1 in Inequality (VIII.78) can be taken to be any vector in 1 q Λ 0 X VpΛ 0 q. Similar to Lemma 31, we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 48. Fix any ζ P p0, 3{4q. If m 1 , m 2 are two uniform messages from 1, 2,¨¨¨, 2 nR ( , then Pr m1,m2,C r|xφpm 1 q, φpm 2 qy| ě nP ζs ď2¨2´n pζ 2 {2´4{q´ε 1 n q . Similar to Lemma 32, we get sumset property using the Lemma 46 and 48.
Lemma 49. Fix any δ P p0, 3{4q, λ P p0, δq, let ζ :" δ´λ. If m 1 , m 2 are two uniform messages from 1, 2,¨¨¨, 2 nR ( , then
IX. CONVERSE A. Scale-and-babble strategy
Our converse works even against stochastic codes which are defined as follows.
Definition 10. A stochastic code C is a code which can map a message to different codewords with certain probability. Formally, the (stochastic) encoder of C is identified with a conditional distribution: for any m P M and any x P B n`0 , ? nP˘,
Pr rEncpmq " xs "P x|m px|mq.
It suffices to design a jamming strategy for James under which no rate larger than C A is achievable. As we shall see, the strategy we are going to design and analyze will turn the adversarial channel into an AWGN channel of certain SNR. AWGN channels are defined below.
Definition 11. An AWGNpP, N q channel is a channel in which the channel input x P R n satisfies }x} 2 ď ? nP and the channel output is y " x`g where g " N p0, N I n q.
Given any stochastic codebook pair pC A , C B q for a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel with vanishing probability of error P e,avg pC A q ď δ n and P e,avg pC B q ď δ n where δ n " o n p1q, we equip James with the following jamming strategy which we call the scale-and-babble strategy.
For notational brevity, we write x A :" x m A and x B :" x m B . Let B :" B n`0 , ? nP˘. Given James' received vector z, define r s :"´αz`g "´αpx A`xB q`g for some α to be optimized later and
where g " N p0, γ 2 I n q and γ 2 " N´2α 2 P p1`2εq for some small constant ε ą 0. Further define E :" }r s} 2 ą ? nN ( , Q :" Pr rEs and e :" 1 E . We will reveal the value of α to Bob and argue that even with such extra information available at decoder, any pC A , C B q (possibly stochastic) is not able to achieve rate larger than 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘. Under the above jamming strategy, when e " 0, the channel to Bob is
Since Bob is assumed to know α, he scales and cancels out his signal p1´αqx B , and gets effectively r y " p1´αqx A`g .
Note that we could assume that
where the expectations are taken over distribution UnifpMqˆP x A |m A and UnifpWqˆP x B |m B , respectively. Otherwise, assume E rx A s " a ‰ 0 and E rx B s " b ‰ 0. Hence every codeword can be decomposed as
Since C A and C B , in particular a and b, are known to every party, James could set r s :" αpz´a´bq`g "´αpx 1
. He cancels out a, b and p1´αqx 1 B and the effective channel becomes r y " p1´αqx 1 A`g , where E rx 1 A s " 0 and g is a Gaussian, which is identical to the previous case.
B. Analysis
Lemma 50. Under the scale-and-babble strategy defined in Sec. IX-A, no code pC A , C B q (possibly stochastic) with vanishing average probability of error for a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel can have rate larger than 1 2 log`1`P N˘. That is C A ď 1 2 log`1`P N˘a nd C B ď 1 2 log`1`P N˘. Proof. To get an upper bound on R A , we decompose nR A using standard information (in)equalities. In the above chain of (in)equalities, 1) Equality (IX.1) follows since m A is uniformly distributed on r2 nR A s.
2) Inequality (IX.2) follows since e is a binary random variable and Ipm A ; eq ď Hpeq ď 1.
3) In Eqn. (IX.3), r y denotes p1´αqx A`g . 4) Inequality (IX.4) is by Fano's inequality and data processing inequality, since conditioned on E c the effective channel to Bob is an AWGN channel. We can take ε n :" R A δ n`1 {n " o n p1q. 5) Equality (IX.5) is justified below,
where Equality (IX.6) follows since g is a white Gaussian noise independent of everything else. In what follows, we upper bound Hpr y|E c q and lower bound Hpg|E c q separately. To bound Hpr y|E c q, note that, by subadditivity of entropy,
Hpr ypiq|E c q.
Each H`r ypiq|E c˘c an be bounded using the principle of maximum entropy. Observe that E c " }r s} 2 ď ? nN ( truncates r s at the boundary of the ball B n`0 , ? nN˘, hence conditioning on E c will not increase the variance of x A`xB`r s. Since y " p1´αqpx A`xB q`g and r y " p1´αqx A`g can be computed by Bob only when E c happens, we have
Equality (IX.7) follows since gpiq is independent of x A piq and has mean 0, variance γ 2 . Now, by the entropy vs. variance bound (Lemma 24),
Since ř n i"1 x A piq 2 ď nP with probability 1, the above bound is maximized when each x A piq 2 is equal to P . We have
The term Hpg|E c q can be bounded in a similar manner. where Inequality (IX.10) follows by noting
and hence E c restricts g to a (random) ball B n`α px A`xB q, ? nN˘in which the variance of g can only be no larger. Finally, combining the bounds (IX.5), (IX.9) and (IX.11), we have
Rearranging terms, we have
As shown in Sec. IX-C, Q " o n p1q. Substituting it back, we get
logp2πeγ 2 q`ε n`2 np1´o n p1qq .
Taking the limit as n Ñ 8, we have
Optimizing over admissible α and sending ε to 0 finishes the proof.
Proof. By definition of Q,
The first two terms are easy to bound. By Gaussian tail bound (Lemma 14), the first one is at most
where g 1 :" @´α px A`xB q, g D " N´0, α 2 }x A`xB } 2 2 γ 2¯. As to the second term, by the standard tail bound of χ 2distributions (Lemma 15),
n˙.
The last term is at most
where in Eqn. (IX.12) we take η 1 " α 2 P ε{2, η 2 " α 2 P ε{γ 2 " α 2 P ε N´2α 2 P p1`2εq . The probability in Eqn. IX.13 is o n p1q by setting η " P ε in Lemma 52 as shown in Sec. IX-D.
All in all, we have
Pr rEs ď expˆ´n η 2 1 8α 2 P γ 2˙`e xpˆ´η 2 2
That is, Q " o n p1q as promised.
D. Empirical properties of AWGN-good codes
To bound the probability (IX.13), we will prove certain empirical property that is universal for any capacity-achieving code for an AWGN channel. To this end, we first define AWGN-goodness.
Definition 12. An infinite sequence of (possibly stochastic) codes tC n u n , where C n Ă B n`0 , ? nP˘is equipped with encoder Enc n and decoder Dec n , is said to be good for AWGNpP, N q channels if ‚ for an arbitrarily small constant δ ą 0 and for all n, RpC n q ě 1 2 logp1`P {N q´δ; and ‚ P e,avg pC n q " o n p1q.
We then prove the following lemma which provides an o n p1q bound on the probability (IX.13).
Lemma 52. Given any two (possibly stochastic) codes C 1 and C 2 that are good for AWGNpP, N q channels, for any constant η P p0, 1q, it holds that lim sup nÑ8 Pr
where the probability is taken over x 1 and x 2 that are chosen according to the encoders of C 1 and C 2 , respectively.
Proof. Suppose RpC 1 q " 1 2 logp1`P {N q´δ 1 and RpC 2 q " 1 2 logp1`P {N q´δ 2 for arbitrarily small constants δ 1 ą 0 and δ 2 ą 0. Suppose C 1 " tx i u iPrM1s and C 2 " x j ( jPrM2s have probability of error ε n and δ n under their decoders Dec 1 and Dec 2 , respectively, when used over an AWGNpP, N q channel. Since C 1 and C 2 are good, ε n nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 0 and δ n nÑ8 ÝÝÝÑ 0. Let M 1 and M 2 denote |C 1 | and |C 2 |, respectively.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists some constant ε ą 0 such that lim sup nÑ8 Pr
Hence for infinitely many n that are sufficiently large, we have ε ď Pr
" Pr
By Markov's inequality, there exists an i 0 P rM 1 s such that
Since P x 1 |m1 pζ i0 |i 0 q ě 0, by the first mean value theorem (Lemma 17) for integral, there exists an x i0 such that the integral (IX.14) equals Pr
Define subcode C 1 2 as C 1 2 :" C 2 X H. Note that C 1 2 is a subcode contained in the pink cap as shown in Fig. 10 .
For each j P rM 2 s, define
Note that Z j ď 1 for every j. It is not hard to see that C 1 2 can also be written as
The encoder of C 1 2 is identified with the following conditional distribution: for every j,
Let K be the size of message set of C 1 2 . Note that K " tj P rM 2 s : Z j ą 0u. By Eqn. (IX.15),
(Note that xj is on the boundary of the cap but it may not be a codeword in C 2 .) Define θ " = x i 0 ,xj . Then, as shown in Fig. 10 , we have
Hence the radius
? nP 1 the the cap can be computed as follows.
?
We get P 1 ă P´η 2 {P ă P . Now move the cap (together with codewords in it) so that its center becomes the origin. We get a new code C 2 2 of the same cardinality K as C 1 2 . Every codeword x 2 j P C 2 2 satisfies
2 with the same decoder Dec 2 as C 2 . We claim that when used over an AWGNpP 1 , N q channel, C 2 2 also has vanishing average probability of error. Indeed, first note that translating codewords does not change the pairwise distance, hence P e,avg pC 2 2 q " P e,avg pC 1 2 q. (Here we use the same decoder Dec 2 for C 1 2 as well.) It suffices to bound P e,avg pC 1 2 q. To this end, define, for every m and Moreover, C 2 2 achieves essentially the same rate as C 2 which achieves the capacity of AWGNpP, N q channels.
However, the AWGNpP 1 , N q that C 2 2 is used over has capacity 1 2 logp1`P 1 {N q ă 1 2 logp1`P {N q. This violates the fundamental channel coding theorem by Shannon and finishes the proof.
Finally, we list several straightforward corollaries of Lemma 52 that may be useful elsewhere.
Corollary 53. Given any (possibly stochastic) codes C 1 , C 2 and C that are good for AWGNpP, N q channels, for any constant η P p0, 1q and k P Z ě2 , it holds that lim sup Using similar ideas, we prove another empirical property that is universal to all AWGN-good codes, thought it is not used in our main proof.
Lemma 54. Given any (possibly stochastic) code C that is good for AWGNpP, N q channels, for any constant η P p0, 1q, it holds that
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that for some constant ε ą 0 ε " Pr
where we defined
for each j P rM s. Now define C 1 :"
By the same considerations as in Lemma 52, we have ‚ on the one hand, C 1 has o n p1q average probability of error when used over AWGNpP p1´ηq, N q channels which have capacity 1 2 logp1`P p1´ηq{N q ă 1 2 logp1`P {N q; ‚ on the other hand, the number of messages that C 1 encodes is M ε, in particular, C 1 achieves rate arbitrarily close to 1 2 logp1`P {N q, which is a contradiction.
E. z-aware symmetrization Lemma 55. For a pP, Nuadratically constrained two-way adversarial channel, assume N " 3P p1`εq{4 for some constant ε ą 0. Then any codebook pair pC A , C B q of sizes |C A | ě ε 2p1`εq and |C B | ě ε 2p1`εq has average error probabilities P e,avg,A ě ε 4p1`εq and P e,avg,B ě ε 4p1`εq . Proof. Given any codebooks C A and C B of positive rate, by similar considerations, we can assume without loss of generality that E rx A s " E rx B s " 0, where the expectation is over x A and x B that are randomly chosen from C A and C B , respectively.
Define r s "´1 2 pz´x 1 A q "´1 2 px A`xB´x 1 A q, where x 1 A is a random codeword from C A . Define s as follows. 
Under the above jamming strategy, Bob receives
If r s satisfies power constraint, , cancelling his own signal, Bob effectively receives r y B " 1 2 px A`x 1 A q. If neither E 1 nor E 2 happens, then Bob has no way to distinguish between x A and x 1 A and the decoding error probability is at least 1{2 under any decoding rule.
We now formally lower bound the probability of error under such a jamming strategy. Then we get that
Pr rEs ď 3nP {4 nN " 1 1`ε .
Substituting the above bound back, we have P e,B ě 1 2ˆ1´1 1`ε´ε 2p1`εq" ε 4p1`εq .
F. Some remarks 1) Using tools from [PV14] , we are able to get a satisfactory bound on Q under maximum probability of error criterion. However, such a criterion makes our problem much harder and less interesting. Indeed, by symmetry, let us consider Bob. To make the maximum error probability large, James only needs to focus on one message. Said differently, we can assume that James knows the message corresponding to the transmitted codeword. Under deterministic encoding, this means that he knows the actual codeword x B from Bob. Given his observation z " x A`xB , he also knows x A . Since Bob aims to decode the message corresponding to x A , James is essentially omniscient in this case. The problem of determining the channel capacity of Bob collapses to the long-standing sphere packing problem. In fact [ZVJS18b] , even stochastic encoding does not help beat the sphere packing bound. As long as James knows the transmitted message, there is a reduction from stochastic encoding to deterministic encoding which turns James omniscient again. 2) The effective channel to Bob who aims to decode x A is like a myopic adversarial channel if we treat x B as noise to James. One difference is that the noise to James is known to Bob, which is usually not assumed in the myopic model. 3) In the general asymmetric case where P A and P B can differ, and N A and N B can also differ, following exactly the same proof as in Sec. IX-E, we get that
. 4) Empirical properties of good codes are not applicable in Sec. IX-E. If the channel is symmetrizable, the capacity is zero and any code has subexponential size. It does not make sense to talk about capacity-achieving distributions, letting alone empirical properties w.r.t. such distributions.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
This paper studies fundamental limits to a two-party message exchange problem over a two-way channel controlled by a malicious adversary who has access to the sum of transmitted signals. We conclude the paper with some final remarks and open questions for future research. ‚ Only in the high-rate regime, our upper bound due to scale-and-babble attack matches our lower bound based on expurgated lattice codes and estimation-type decoder. Specifically, we require SNR to be a function (gpδq) of the gap-to-capacity δ.
We believe such a technical requirement can be relaxed to a condition that SNR ą K for certain universal constant K (independent of δ). The can be potentially proved by bounding the error probability also over the random lattice construction, e.g., via Construction-A. 2 In this way, the technical requirement on SNR will be replaced by a large field size q of the based code in Construction-A, which we are fine to afford. ‚ We do not believe that the constraint on SNR can be completely removed. Instead, we believe that in low-SNR regime the capacity is strictly less than 1 2 log`1 2`P N˘. The intuition comes from our symmetrization result. The bound 1 2 log`1 2`P Nȋ s only valid when SNR ě 1{2 since otherwise it is negative. However, our z-aware symmetrization attack shows that no positive rate can be achieved as long as SNR ď 4{3. The threshold 4{3 is larger than 1{2 at which the bound 1 2 log`1 2`P Nȋ s still strictly positive. Such a gap suggests that our bound may not be tight in the low-SNR regime. Understanding the behaviour of capacity in the low-SNR regime remains an intriguing open question.
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APPENDIX A LATTICE PRIMER
For a tutorial introduction to lattices and their applications, see the book by Zamir [Zam14] or the notes by Barvinok [Bar13] .
If v 1 , . . . , v k are linearly independent vectors in R n , then the set of all integer linear combinations of v 1 , . . . , v k is called the lattice generated by the vectors v 1 , . . . , v k , i.e., If G " rv 1¨¨¨vk s, then we can write Λ " GZ k . The matrix G is called a generator matrix for Λ. The generator matrix of a lattice is not unique. The integer k is invariant for a lattice and is called the rank of Λ. In this paper, we only consider lattices in R n having rank n. It is obvious that Λ is a discrete subgroup of R n under vector addition. It is also a fact that every discrete subgroup of R n is a lattice [Bar13] .
For any lattice Λ, it is natural to define the quantizer Q Λ which maps every point in R n to the closest lattice point, i.e., for every x P R n , Q Λ pxq :" argmin yPΛ }y´x}, (A.1)
where we assume that ties (in computing the closest lattice point) are resolved according to some arbitrary but fixed rule. Associated with the quantizer is the quantization error rxs mod Λ :" x´Q Λ pxq.
For every lattice Λ, we define the following parameters: ‚ The set PpΛq :" tGx : x P r0, 1q n u,
where G is a generator matrix of Λ, is called the fundamental parallelepiped of Λ. ‚ The fundamental Voronoi region VpΛq is the set of all points in R n which are closest to the zero lattice point. In other words, VpΛq :" tx P R n : Q Λ pxq " 0u.
Any set S Ă R n such that the set of translates of S by lattice points, i.e., tS`x : x P Λu form a partition of R n , is called a fundamental region of Λ. It is a fact that every fundamental region of Λ has the same volume equal to det Λ :" | detpGq|, where G is any generator matrix of Λ. The quantity det Λ is called the determinant or covolume of Λ (also denoted by VolpΛq). It is a fact that det Λ " VolpVpΛqq. ‚ The covering radius r cov pΛq is the radius of the smallest closed ball in R n which contains VpΛq. It is also equal to the length of the largest vector within VpΛq. ‚ The packing radius r pack pΛq is the radius of the largest open ball which is contained within VpΛq. Equivalently, it is half the minimum distance between two lattice points. ‚ The effective radius r eff pΛq is equal to the radius of a ball having volume equal to VolpVpΛqq. Clearly, we have r pack pΛq ď r eff pΛq ď r cov pΛq.
In the context of power-constrained communication over Gaussian channels, a lattice code is typically the set of all lattice points within a convex compact subset of R n , i.e., C " Λ X B for some set B Ă R n . Usually B is taken to be B n p0, ? nP q or VpΛ 0 q for some lattice Λ 0 constructed so as to satisfy the power constraint.
If Λ 0 , Λ are two lattices in R n with the property that Λ 0 Ĺ Λ, then Λ 0 is said to be nested within (or, a sublattice of) Λ. A nested lattice code with a fine lattice Λ and coarse lattice Λ 0 Ĺ Λ is the lattice code Λ X VpΛ 0 q.
Lattices have been extensively used for problems of packing, covering and communication over Gaussian channels. For many problems of interest, we want to construct high-dimensional lattices Λ such that r pack pΛq{r eff pΛq is as large as possible, and r cov pΛq{r eff pΛq is as small as possible. A class of lattices that has these properties is the class of Construction-A lattices, which we describe next.
Let q be a prime number, and C lin be an pn, kq linear code over F q . The Construction-A lattice obtained from C lin is defined to be ΛpC lin q :" tv P Z n : rvs mod pqZ n q P ΦpCqu,
where Φ denotes the natural embedding of F n q in R n . An equivalent definition is that ΛpC lin q " ΦpC lin q`qZ n . We make use of the following result to choose our coarse lattices:
Theorem 56 ([ELZ05]). For every δ ą 0, there exist sequences of prime numbers q n and positive integers k n such that if C lin is a randomly chosen linear code 3 over F qn , then
